To date, there is little convincing evidence on the effectiveness of "quasi-regulatory" mechanisms.
1 Brouhle, et al., 2004 2 For a strong over-view, see Brouhle, et al., 2004 . See also Bennear (2007) and Stafford (2003) . Environmental regulation in the United States has evolved slowly from the traditional command and control strategies dominant during the early 1970s to the more market-based regimes that we see today. Those market-based approaches include voluntary programs and initiatives, or "quasi-regulations," aimed at incentivizing pollution reduction without legally requiring abatement by polluters. Quasi-regulatory mechanisms are becoming more frequently used by regulators, particularly for pollutants that are not easily regulated using command and control strategies.
Currently, there are more than 50 such voluntary programs and initiatives at the federal level, 1 with several dozen more at the state level. Given the growing reliance that regulators are placing on such mechanisms it is important to understand how, (if at all) they affect polluter behavior.
To date, much of the empirical work on the effectiveness of quasi-regulatory mechanisms has been unconvincing. 2 That stems, in part, from the difficulty of separating the effects of the various elements of formal and informal environmental regulations that confront polluters. Weak identification strategies dictated by data limitations have also proved problematic. To address some of those problems, I make use of micro-level data on toxic releases, and focus on a particular set of quasi-regulatory initiatives called pollution prevention ("P2") programs. I develop a detailed data set on P2 programs and exploit variation in adoption dates to estimate their effects on facility level 3 OPPT Overview -Draft Version 2.0.
-4-behavior. The potentially confounding effects of various formal regulatory measures, as well as international agreements, are also addressed. Different control groups are used to validate the robustness of the results.
The programs that I study include the federally mandated Pollution Prevention Act (PPA) of 1990 as well as 38 different state-level P2 programs. Those programs primarily target hazardous waste, toxic waste, and toxic releases. P2 programs aim to reduce pollution by encouraging "source reduction and other practices that reduce or eliminate the creation of pollutants through: increased efficiency in the use of raw materials, energy, water, or other resources; or [the] protection of natural resources by conservation." 3 P2 programs range from offering awards that publicly acknowledge exemplary pollution prevention initiatives to implementing non-reporting penalties; from providing free on-site technical assistance and educational outreach, to joint research initiatives between local government and industry.
Using a balanced panel consisting of more than 7100 manufacturing facilities over a 16 year period, I find strong evidence that both federal and state P2 programs have had a significant effect on polluter behavior. In particular, I find that (1) the 1990 PPA was responsible for reductions in average facility level releases of between 65%-76%; and that (2) the adoption of state P2 programs corresponded to a decline in average facility releases of between 11.5% -12.4%. I also find that the state "adoption" effect is much larger for facilities located in early adopting states (24%) than in late adopting states (5%). Those results are robust to using either the balanced or unbalanced panel of manufacturing facilities, as well as to changes in the range of years used in the analysis. A test to determine whether the results are driven by spurious correlation is soundly rejected.
-5-Of the different state P2 programs that I study, programs that reduced the cost of participation, in particular, technical assistance and educational outreach programs have been the most successful at reducing toxic releases. I find, however, that the timing of the reductions depends upon a number of factors, including the length of time the program has been in place as well as whether other states have already adopted similar programs. There is a strong evidence to suggest that spill-over effects play an important role in the effectiveness of these types of programs.
State P2 programs that increase the ability of regulators to monitor polluters, such as filing fees and non-reporting penalties, are also found to have had an effect on polluter behavior.
Surprisingly, filing fees tend to increase reported releases. This, however, could reflect a change in reporting behavior, and not necessarily a change in polluting behavior. Non-reporting penalties, over-all, however, were mostly ineffective at altering facility behavior, except in the case of toxic substances that could be easily monitored by regulators. For those substances, non-reporting penalties led to lower levels of reported releases. I argue that the ineffectiveness of non-reporting penalties may reflect a fundamental problem facing regulators of toxic releases that arises because regulators cannot validate the accuracy of the self-reported toxic releases.
that arises with toxic releases as regulators cannot validate the accuracy of the self-reported TRI data.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II I provide regulatory background on federal and state level statutes. Section III describes the data used in the estimation, while Section IV discusses the model used in the estimation. Section V provides basic summary statistics for the data and in Section VI I discuss estimation results. Section VII concludes.
II. BACKGROUND
Toxic substances are those that are either known to be, or are suspected of being, -6-hazardous to human health at low levels of exposure. Their storage, handling, transportation, and disposal are all strictly regulated. Yet, for many of these substances there is no formal regulation of their release into the environment. In part, this may be due to the mandate given to the EPA to set standards that protect health and human welfare. If a substance is known to be toxic at low levels of exposure, the appropriate emissions standard may be zero. Banning a substance, however, is not always feasible. In addition to the different programs offered, state P2 programs also differed in one other important dimension -their level of stringency. To capture this difference, I classify states into 1 of 2 categories: low and high stringency states. Low stringency states are those that have no target reduction goals for toxic releases, whereas high stringency states are those that have state-wide numeric reduction goals for toxic releases with specific compliance dates.
IV. BASIC MODEL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
To estimate the effect of P2 programs on releases, (reduced form) releases are modeled as:
( 1) where ln(TRI) is the natural log of facility-level TRI releases for facility i, in industry j, state s, and 4 Endogeneity would be far more likely if releases were aggregated to the industry or state level.
-10-year t. PPA is an indicator variable controlling for the 1990 PPA which takes on the value of 1 from 1990 -2003, and 0 otherwise. Z is a vector of P2 state-level programs, differentiated by their basic characteristics (eg. provision of technical assistance or non-reporting penalties) that take the value of 1 if the state has a particular program in a given year, and 0 otherwise. Indicator variables are included to capture various fixed effects at the facility (*), industry (F), and year (() level. , is assumed to be a well behaved random error term with a conditional mean of zero.
For the above to consistently estimate $ 1 and ', the "treatment" variables must be uncorrelated with any time-varying unobservables that affect facility level releases: in other words, , must be orthogonal to the adoption of federal and state-level P2 programs. It is important to recognize that it is unlikely that any endogeneity arises due to facility level releases being correlated with federal and state-level P2 adoption dates or program choices, primarily because individual facilities are not generally large enough to influence the state level regulatory environment. In columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 , summary statistics are given for the facilities pre and post adoption of a state P2 program, with the average change between those periods shown in the last column. Data for the year of adoption is not included in either column. On average, aggregate facility level releases were more than 39% (37% for net TRI) lower by weight after the adoption of a state P2 program. Net TRI 33/50 substances were 22% lower, net Montreal Protocol substances were 86% lower, and CAA air releases were 44% lower. Although these reductions are impressive, whether they can be attributed to the adoption of P2 programs or to other factors such as improvements in abatement technology over time, changes in output levels, regulatory changes, or something else, cannot be determined from the descriptive statistics, alone.
In determining how facility level toxic releases respond to P2 programs, care should be given -12-to the possibility of "equilibrium sorting" where firms make location choices based on compatibility with certain state characteristics. For example, "green" firms may be more likely to locate in more environmentally forward states. If so, facility response may systematically differ across groups based on these (potentially unknown) state characteristics, in which case, estimates based on the whole sample may obscure important behavioral patterns in the data. To allow for this, I also group facilities by: (1) whether they are located in a state that is an "early" or "late" adopter of P2
programs, relative to the 1990 PPA, and (2) whether they are located in a state which has a "low" P2 stringency level (no target reduction goal) or a "high" P2 stringency level (specified target reduction goal).
In Table II , Panels 1 and 2, facilities are grouped by whether they are located in a state that adopted a P2 program before 1990 ("early" adopter) or after 1990 ("late" adopter). Facilities located in states that adopted a state program in 1990 are not included in the calculations of the descriptive statistics given here. There are important differences in facility level releases across the early and late adopting states. For example, average, aggregate releases in early adopting states were only 60% as large as the releases in late adopting states. Early adopting states also had a relatively small reduction in aggregate TRI releases, with a large increase in TRI releases, net of CAA substances.
For all other measures of toxic releases, early adopters showed reductions, post adoption, but those reductions were much smaller than those found in late adopting states. Furthermore, late adopting states showed reductions in all measures of toxic releases.
The choice of P2 programs also differs dramatically across early and late adopting states.
In particular, technical assistance programs and grants were far more commonly available in early adopting states, relative to late adopting states, whereas filing fees and non-reporting penalties were -13-more common in late adopting states. Note that even before adoption, facilities located in the most stringent P2 program states have average releases that are lower than those found in other states, for all measures of toxic releases, except for CAA air releases, where the average facility level release is almost the same. And after the adoption of a P2 program, facility releases in the high P2 states fell by more than for those in low P2 states, again, with the exception for CAA air releases. CAA air releases actually fell more in the lower-stringency states so that post-adoption, average facility level releases were lower in low P2
states than in high P2 states. The most stringent P2 states also had a much higher rate of technical assistance and educational outreach, but a lower rate of grant support, filing fees and non-reporting penalties.
The differences in pre/post adoption facility level releases across early/late adopters and low/high stringency states captured by the descriptive statistics suggests that there may be important differences across these facilities. There are also important distinctions that exist at the state and industry levels between these groups. (Table IV provides data on the number of facilities found in each group.) In particular, an examination of the unbalanced panel of TRI reporters shows that the pattern of entering and exiting facilities (measured by the ratio of entering (or exiting) facilities to the number of facilities in the balanced panel) differs significantly in high P2 stringency states (see Table V ). Here, the ratio is almost double in magnitude compared to that found in low P2 stringency states. This elevated level of entry and exit could reflect a higher level of competitiveness in the manufacturing sector. Industry composition also differs by group as evidenced by the sound rejection (p = 0.000) of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the equality across the distribution of by the total number of manufacturing facilities operating in that industry-state for that year. So, although there are differences across these groups, we can rule out that both the changes in releases over time within these groups, and the differences across these groups, are attributable to changes in industry composition or structure.
IV. RESULTS
Regression results are given for three of the four different facility groupings discussed in the previous section. Results for facilities located in low stringency states are given below, broken down by adoption date (early/late). Due to both a lack of variation in, and a high level of correlation between, state P2 programs in high stringency states, results for these facilities are not included here, but are available upon request.
Four different measures of toxic releases are used in the analysis. The first consists of aggregate TRI releases for all TRI reporting chemicals in the balanced panel (as described in Section III). These chemicals are aggregated by weight across all pollution media. To address the issue of confounding effects from the CAA, the 1990 CAAA, and other potentially important policies, I also include measures for TRI releases, TRI 33/50 releases, and TRI Montreal Protocol releases, all net of CAA substances.
A. The Effects of State P2 Program Adoption on Facility Releases
If P2 programs affect facility level releases, it should be the case that facilities that 5 Regression results for other subsets of TRI substances, such as CAA substances, and net air releases, as well as for the unbalanced panel, are available upon request. All of these results are consistent with those presented here.
-15-have access to P2 programs differ from facilities that do not have such access. Although the descriptive statistics suggest that this may be the case, they do not establish a causal relationship. An event-study, however, can be used to determine whether the adoption of a state P2 program affects facility level releases, under the assumption of state-program exogeneity -which is reasonable at the facility level but would be much harder to defend at a higher level of aggregation. Regressing the natural log of toxic releases (at time t) on an indicator variable which takes on the value of 1 if a facility in year t is located in a state which has an active P2 program in year t, and 0 otherwise (and controlling for year, industry (at the 2-digit SIC level), and facility level fixed effects) allows for the average treatment effect to be estimated. Regression results for aggregate toxic releases and toxic releases net of CAA substances are summarized in Table VI . 5 First, note that in all cases, the effect of the 1990 PPA is negative and statistically significant. This is consistent with the generally held belief that the federal program was successful and helped polluters to reduce pollution levels. With respect to the adoption of a state P2 program, for both aggregate toxic releases and toxic releases net of CAA substances, the effect on facility level releases of the adoption of a state P2 program is negative, and statistically significant (for aggregate TRI releases, $ = -0.115, SE = 0.03 and for TRI releases net of CAA substances, $ = -0.124, SE = 0.03), even when taking into account year, industry, and facility level fixed effects. Interestingly, when facilities are grouped by whether the state is an early or late adopter relative to the 1990 PPA, 6 Note that this is the case even though the descriptive statistics show that facilities in early adopting states became (on average) dirtier after the adoption of a state P2 program. The descriptive statistics results are due to behavior exhibited by 15 facilities in the data set. These facilities are in SIC codes 28 and 33 and their "adverse" effects on releases are captured by the facility fixed effects. 7 The event study results are robust to the inclusion of industry-year fixed effects in lieu of individual industry and year fixed effects. Finally, the coefficient on adoption continues to be negative for facilities located in lateadopting states for both measures of toxic releases, but is imprecisely estimated in both cases.
B. Testing for Spurious Correlation.
Before continuing, it is important to rule out the possibility that the event study results are due to spurious correlation. In an ideal world, one could test for this by choosing an arbitrary adoption date taken from before the start of any state P2 program and testing for the significance of the "false" adoption date. Unfortunately, that option is foreclosed from us as TRI data only start in -17-1987 and 61% of the facilities in the balanced panel have adoption dates that fall on or before 1989.
I can, however, conduct the experiment where I take facilities that are located in late-adopting states (adoption post 1990), and for this group, construct a false adoption date in 1987. This is a somewhat less "clean" test than the ideal one because if there are any spill-over effects from "treated" facilities to "non-treated" facilities, these effects may still be captured by the false adoption date. I would expect, however, that even in that case, both the magnitude of the coefficient as well as the level of significance would be much smaller in the false regression than in the true regression.
Results for the false adoption-date regressions are summarized in One additional comment should be made regarding this test. It could be said that it is not surprising to find the "false" adoption date to be insignificant when the effect of the true adoption date is not statistically significant in late adopting states. But, given that the sign is the same and that both the difference in magnitude, as well as the difference in statistical significance is large, I would argue that this result does provide reassurance that the strategy employed here is valid and that the results are not likely to be due to spurious correlation.
C. The Effects of Individual State P2 Programs on Facility Releases
Given the evidence that state P2 program adoption affects facility level releases, I turn next to estimating the effects of individual P2 programs. As described earlier, six different state -18-programs were identified: technical assistance programs, educational outreach, grants, awards, filing fees, and non-reporting penalties. Due to the small number of observations, awards programs are not included in the analysis.
In general, P2 programs may be classified into one of two groups: cost-reducing programs and monitoring programs. Cost-reducing programs are believed to encourage participation in P2
programs by reducing the cost to the polluter of engaging in pollution prevention activities or abatement. These would include grant programs, which would directly lower the cost of participation, as well as technical assistance and educational outreach programs, which would indirectly lower the cost of participation by providing information to polluters on pollution prevention and abatement activities. Although in theory, all three of these programs could lead to a reduction in facility level releases, the manner in which this might occur may differ depending upon whether costs are reduced directly or indirectly. In particular, when cost-reduction occurs through the provision of information, two important considerations must be taken into account. The first is that there may be a period of "learning" which takes place so reductions may not occur immediately. And second, there may be informational spill-overs that occur from areas with P2 programs to areas without P2 programs.
Monitoring programs are programs that increase the ability of a regulator to directly, or indirectly monitor polluter behavior and encourage participation in P2 programs by signaling to polluters that regulators are watching to see whether they are responding to the quasi-regulatory mechanisms. This is believed to induce polluters to engage in pollution reducing, risk-management strategies. In the case of P2, filing fees and non-reporting penalties belong to this group by (1) encouraging polluters to report to the TRI (via non-reporting penalties, which increase the cost of non-participation) and (2) having polluters provide summary information to state regulators on their polluting behavior (via filing fees, which increase the cost of participation). It is not clear, however, how facilities might respond to these programs in light of the fact that regulators have limited (or no) ability to validate the accuracy of the reported release data. On the one hand, increased regulatory scrutiny may lead to a reduction in pollution if the polluter believes that regulators will adopt more stringent regulatory measures if the polluter does not voluntarily abate. On the other hand, increased regulatory scrutiny may lead to a change in reporting behavior if the polluter believes that regulators will look more carefully at the accuracy of the reporting, in which case, reported releases may increase as over-reporting will be less likely to incur any penalty than under-reporting. Because of the potential for confounding effects from the CAA and the 1990 CAAA, it is important to take care when interpreting the above results. So, to alleviate some of those issues, in Columns 4-6 I summarize regression results based on TRI releases net of any CAA substances.
When using only TRI releases net of CAA substances, I find that for the entire sample, (column 4), the effect of the Federal program is much larger (-1.5 versus -0.31), and dissipates somewhat more slowly over time. No state programs, however, have any statistically significant effect. When the sample is broken down into early and late adopters, however, a different picture emerges. First, facilities located in early adopting states have a much larger (negative) response to the Federal program with the effect slowly dissipating over time, the longer the state has had a P2 program in place. Technical assistance programs lead to lower facility level releases as well, and their effects increase slowly over time. Educational outreach continues to have a large, negative (and statistically significant) effect on facility releases upon adoption. Although non-reporting penalties do not have any effect on facility releases, filing fees lead to an increase in average facility level 9 One exception is TRI CAA air releases. For this group of toxic releases, non-reporting penalties have a very strong, negative effect on facility releases.
-21-releases.
9
When compared to facilities located in late adopting states, the Federal program has a much smaller (but still statistically significant) effect on average facility level releases. The effect of technical assistance programs, however, is large (negative), and statistically significant with no "learning" time. In fact, the effects of the technical assistance programs decline the longer the state has had a P2 program. No other state P2 programs have any statistically significant effect on average facility releases.
It is also interesting to look at the effects of P2 programs on TRI substances that are affected by other policies, such as the voluntary TRI 33/50 program and the Montreal Protocol. So, in Table   VIII , Panel 2, I re-estimate equation (1) for these two measures of toxic releases, again, net of any CAA substances. While Montreal Protocol substances appear to be unaffected by any state P2 programs, that is not the case for TRI 33/50 substances. Although this sub-category of chemicals constitute a very small portion of over-all TRI releases, technical assistance programs appear to have a strong effect on their level of releases -with a slightly larger effect being found for facilities in late adopting states. Similar to TRI CAA substances, non-reporting penalties also appear to lower the level of TRI 33/50 substances as well, although in this case, the coefficient is only precisely estimated for the entire sample of reporters, and not for early/late adopters. One possible explanation for this result is that unlike the bulk of TRI releases, for both TRI CAA and 33/50 substances, regulators are able to monitor pollution releases and validate reported releases more easily. In that case, non-reporting and under-reporting can be identified more readily and penalized, making a non-reporting penalty a more viable threat to polluters.
There is some question as to whether these results might be the result of using a balanced panel which only contains facilities that are in operation for a full 16 years. Although the results are not presented here, regressions based on the unbalanced panel of TRI reporters yield remarkably consistent results, throughout, strongly suggesting that the estimated effects of P2 programs on facility level releases are not due to special characteristics of the long-lived facilities used in the balanced panel.
VI.
CONCLUDING REMARKS.
The provision of government sponsored programs that are designed to encourage pollution prevention and abatement are a growing part of the regulatory arsenal used to manage environmental quality, but are not well understood. In this study, I find strong evidence to support the proposition that both federal and state P2 programs have had an effect on facility level toxic releases, but the effects depend critically not only on the relative timing of the program's adoption but also on the changes in their effects over time. This first factor is related to the benefits associated with spill-over effects that can occur when P2 programs collect and disseminate information to polluters. Providing this public good allows facilities in late adopting states to take advantage of the information made available in early adopting states, which can translate into more rapid reductions in pollution.
The second factor is related to two different effects. The first relates to the possibility that the type of information, or how the information is used by a given facility, may change over time. Evaluating the over-all effectiveness of P2 programs on toxic polluter behavior is made even more difficult by the fact that it is almost impossible to validate the accuracy of the toxic release data. This problem is reflected in the facility level response to filing fees and non-reporting
penalties. It appears to be the case that filing fees affect a polluter's reporting behavior, but not necessarily their polluting behavior. And it is precisely because regulators cannot verify the data that this response can occur. Non-reporting penalties are, likewise, affected, in that they are only effective for the subset of TRI substances that can be most easily monitored by regulators: CAA substances, and TRI 33/50 chemicals. Without the ability to validate the quality of the data, regulators cannot easily determine whether the program is affecting polluting reporting or polluting behavior. Clearly, it is the latter that is desired, but improving the ability to validate the toxic release data should be an integral part of any regulatory measure. 
